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Geographical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), 1-20.

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The Geographical Review

VOLUME 80

January 1990

NUMBER 1

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF PANREGIONS*

JOHN O'LOUGHLIN and HERMAN VAN DER WUSTEN

ABSTRACT. German geopolitical writers in the 1930s proposed a tripartite division of the world into large panregions of American, European, and Japanese hegemony. This model is examined, with attention to imperialist ambitions in Africa. Six indicators of international relations (diplomatic ties, memberships in intergovernmental organizations, air-traffic links, trade and foreign investments, developmental aid, and arms sales and military intervention) are used to analyze the applicability of the model. The concept of Eurafrika is less valid now than it was before World War II because of waning colonial ties, activities of non-European states, and the marginal role of Africa in world affairs. Western European influence is decreasing in Africa. Eurafrika is still a premature geopolitical concept.

GEOPOLITICS and political geography have always been uneasy relatives. Geopolitics has been regarded as applied political geography, less objective and scientific than the mother discipline but nonetheless grafted onto it. Pure and applied aspects of a discipline can, but need not, be very different. As each geopolitical worldview assumes that the position of the country in question should be advanced according to its national aspirations, there appears to be little common ground among various interpretations. Because of close connections to powerful belief systems, mutually restricted attention to methods of others, and the atmosphere of high uncertainty in foreign relations, geopolitics runs the risk of being overly ideological. Stated another way, geopolitics is neither maximally grounded in fact nor minimally secured against unwarranted, value-laden assumptions.

The purpose of this article is to examine the evolution of political-geographical concepts by assessing the important concept of panregion that was associated with the school of geopolitics formulated by Karl Haushofer and his followers after World War I (Weigert 1942; Whittlesey 1942; Paterson 1987; Kost 1988). A panregion is a large functional area linking core states

* We thank Henning Heske, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, and Peter J. Taylor for commenting on early drafts of this article.

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to resource peripheries and cutting across latitudinally distributed environmental zones. To focus the discussion, we identify the origins of the concept and describe its variable content over time, analyze the case of Eurafrika, and determine whether the concept still merits attention in light of a half-century of global and regional changes.

Most studies take for granted the ideological nature of German geopolitics and review the geopolitical concepts in the context of the period of World War II (1939–1945). The empirical basis of the concepts and the theoretical justification remain unexamined (Klein 1985; Parker 1985). We want to restore the link between pure and applied political geography and to examine geopolitics from the perspective of its contribution to politico-geographical knowledge. This approach does not neglect the ideological, ethnocentric nature of geopolitics; instead it is clearly exposed. However, there is the opportunity to rescue some potentially useful notions from the ideological debris.

IMPERIALISM IN GERMAN GEOPOLITICS

The concept of a world divided into panregions evolved from the debates in German *Geopolitik* on the merits of overseas expansion in comparison with settlement of eastern Europe and on the costs and benefits of colonial possessions. Although the roots of the political geography of German imperialism predated Friedrich Ratzel, his work inspired Haushofer and his followers. Ratzel (1896), with his seven laws of the spatial growth of states, had provided a powerful political justification for the organic expansion of large states at the expense of small, weak neighbors. Five spatial concepts formed the core of *Geopolitik*, and all had antecedents in the works of Ratzel and Sir Halford Mackinder (Whittlesey 1944). The concepts were movable frontiers, the heartland theory, and three related items, autarky, *Lebensraum*, and *Panideen*, that are the focus of this study. For geopolitikers, every large state needed *Lebensraum* (literally, living space) or room to expand. From this viewpoint, Germany with its millennium of eastern colonization had a natural interest in further conquest in eastern Europe. To be autarkic or self-sufficient, a state needed a large territory with domestic access to the products and the raw materials necessary for continued prosperity as a modern industrial society. Autarky and *Lebensraum* are therefore complementary.

Like other European states, Germany saw colonies as an essential source of raw materials, and a consistent theme in geopolitical writings was the demand for the return of the colonies lost after World War I (Obst 1926). Haushofer (1931a) admired the American model of an underpopulated, large home territory with room for further settlement, a large informal empire in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, and control of strategic points like Hawaii. He argued that Japan and Germany should emulate this model. According to Carl Troll (1949), Nazi policy changed in 1936 to consider the possibility of overseas settlement, and the special attention of the geopoliti-

tikers to eastern European settlements was reduced until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 again brought the eastern question to the forefront. The number of pages in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," the journal outlet for Haushofer and his opinions, that were devoted to the problems of overseas colonies and eastern settlements rose and fell in tandem with political developments in central and eastern Europe. For the geopolitikers, the benefits of colonies could be achieved only through unhindered trade, which required world peace; however, that in effect would permanently emasculate the German nation by continuing the Versailles treaty. Only through an expansive territorial policy that required war could Germany realize its destiny. The seat of power was in Europe, and there only could Germany realize its highest achievements (Earle 1944, 506).

The precise boundaries of German Lebensraum were never defined or agreed upon, despite the fact that the notion of *Mitteleuropa* as both a geographically distinct region and a German *Volksboden* had been stated early in the century (Partsch 1906). Ratzel used the Lebensraum concept, but Rudolf Kjellen (1917), a Swede, integrated Ratzel's work into modern power politics. Coining the term geopolitics, Kjellen defined it as "the science of the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space" (Parker 1985, 55). According to the pan-German Kjellen, *Mitteleuropa* expanded into southeastern and eastern Europe and eventually followed the line of the Berlin-Baghdad railway to incorporate the Middle East, with a later extension westward into Africa. The East was Germany's manifest destiny, and by the 1930s Germany dominated the trade and exports of most states in the region (Dorpalen 1942, 222-230). The feasibility of the Berlin-Baghdad axis was discussed as both a military and a cultural-economic strategy in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik." In addition to this indirect route to Africa, other, direct possibilities for extending German influence across the Mediterranean Sea were offered, but all paled by comparison with the attraction of a renewed drive to the East (Heske 1987).

During the nineteenth century, two imperialist ideologies developed in Germany (Smith 1986). Lebensraum was equated with "migrationist colonialism," while economic imperialism, which viewed colonies mostly as resource peripheries, was termed *Weltpolitik*. Hitler so envisioned Lebensraum to the East that he referred to the Ukraine as Germany's India (Crozier 1988, 272). The disagreement over the better imperialist prospect reflected a deep division in German society between the traditional agrarian Right, of which Haushofer was a stalwart, and the industrial magnates who had sponsored and invested in the Baghdad railway. Geopolitik encompassed both imperialist streams, and, despite Haushofer's personal predilections, representations of the *Weltpolitik* school were expressed in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" (Ross 1933, 1936; Reisner 1937).

The development of a panregional consciousness, in a sense, was an outgrowth of the Lebensraum quest. Haushofer endeavored to provoke his

countrymen to break with parochialism and to think in terms of global issues and realms (Paterson 1987). His worldview was determined both by contemporary political developments and by personal interests and goals. He supported Japanese expansion in the Pacific realm, although he warned of the dangers of military entanglements in China. He promoted a Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis and a neutralized Soviet Union. Haushofer urged cooperation with the Soviet Union for control of the central Eurasian heartland, which was effectively realized by the 1939 nonaggression pact. He recognized that any large shift in world order would have to involve the end of British and French control of large empires and predicted interimperial struggles, especially in the Pacific realm. He envied the achievements of the United States in amassing an informal hemispheric empire and saw American cross-Pacific expansion and tentative reach to West Africa as evidence of a global design. Repeatedly, he referred to the Pacific rimlands as the zone of the future, and he contrasted the political-economic dynamism of this area with the stagnation of Europe and its colonies. The best prospect for Europe lay in forming an industrial core region, connected with complementary geographical areas, that would enable Germany and its neighbors to compete effectively with the other global powers: the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States (Haushofer 1931a and b, 1934, 1942, 1946).

PANREGIONS

Although the concept of Panideen, or panideas, was not an explicit focus in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," it was the primary element of Geopolitik seized on by American commentators during the war, because panregions were viewed as an essential part of German strategy. Panideas are general principles for organizing the world system or basic ideologies for many units. The geopolitikers felt that each political unit, whether small like a nation-state or large like the British empire, needed an ideological basis and would collapse without one. As examples of panideas, Haushofer (1931b) offered Panislamism, Panamericanism, and Panasianism. Other potential panideas like Paneuropa and Pangermanism existed but were not likely to be expressed as geopolitical units because public interest or political will was lacking. In this light, the Monroe Doctrine was a panidea and was repeatedly described as such in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" (Paulig 1930; Schmolck 1937, 1943; Haushofer 1942). Panregions were the geographical expression of panideas and have come to be associated with the division of the globe into spheres of influence by the superpowers (Chaliand and Rageau 1985). In our examination of this aspect of panideas, it should be noted that the term panregion originally applied to any geographical supernational expression of a panidea.


Haushofer and his followers used Ratzel's concept of *Grosslebensformen*, the formation of large cultural-organic units, to promote the panregional concept. Clearly there are links between large economic and political units,

although they need not share the same boundaries; a large economic unit could be divided among numerous states. The two ideas blended in the work of Robert Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923). Haushofer (1931b) attributed his notion of panideas to Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision of a politically and economically unified Europe. Motivated by the destruction of World War I, Coudenhove-Kalergi sent a letter in 1921 to the editors of several leading European newspapers, in which he advocated the creation of a pan-European union (Barthalay 1981, 82–95). After the attention stirred by his book, he founded a pan-European movement that numerous prominent persons joined. He envisioned a federal relationship, but the League of Nations rejected such a proposal in 1929. Haushofer (1931b) reproduced Coudenhove-Kalergi's map of Paneuropa and other global divisions and later (1946, 22) recalled his own associations with the Paneuropa circle.

The European panidea was based on cultural arrangements and had political aims. It also had an economic background, but there is little evidence that the geopolitikers gave much attention to the economic literature on the subject. The concept of an economically unified Europe had been broached by Friedrich List early in the nineteenth century as a customs union focused on Germany. Contemporaneously Konstantin Frantz maintained that the only hope of preventing the emergence of the United States and the Russian Empire as world superpowers was for Germany to be the leader in the formation of a federated Europe (Sloan 1988). Later, the locational theorist Alfred Weber developed the notion of a European *Grosswirtschaftsraum*, with a core comprising the industrial parts of Germany and adjoining states with a rural periphery. The theme was partially adopted by the geopolitikers, but it did not assume importance in a subject dominated by cultural considerations.

Some rearrangement of the extant global division of imperial control would be needed if the Paneuropa plan were implemented. Coudenhove-Kalergi included French colonial possessions in his Paneuropa, but he both excluded the British Empire and kept the United Kingdom separate from continental Europe. This argument was the basis for his including more than half of Africa in Paneuropa, or Eurafrica as Haushofer later labeled it (Haushofer 1938). Obst was evidently the first to use this term (Heske 1987); he conceived Eurafrica as a political unit dominated by the German-Italian axis (Obst 1941). He had high hopes of a profitable exploitation of African resources that would lead to greater prosperity for all of the "economically symbiotic" Eurafrica (Heske 1987, 13–14). Obst did not advocate German settlement in Africa; instead he stressed the economic basis of the Europe-Africa link and how it would strengthen the global position of Europe and the Axis powers.

There is evidence of a Weltpolitik or economic perception of the Europe-Africa link by the German government rather than a Lebensraum or settlement scheme in a remarkable series of maps published in "Facts in Review" (1941) (Figs. 1a–e). This propaganda publication, designed to win American




MAP I.

The four principal industrial centers of the world and their respective natural spheres of interest (*Grossraumwirtschaften*) are indicated in black. Food and raw material producing areas essential to world economy are shaded. The blank spaces indicate undeveloped territories, as well as those that are, at least for the present, of little consequence in international commercial relations. All values are indicated in Reichsmarks.

FIG. 1a

A BIRDSEYE VIEW OF WORLD ECONOMY



MAP II.

A graphic depiction of the flow of world trade between the four economic spheres. As the map shows, Europe's trade with Greater East Asia is somewhat larger than with America. The Russian sector plays only a minor role in world trade as yet.

FIG. 1b

Figs. 1a-e—Economic perception of Europe-Africa links. Source: *Facts in Review* 10 April 1941.

MAP III.

A glance at this map shows that Europe's foreign trade, 36 percent of the world's total commerce, leads all other important economic regions in this respect. It is significant that Europe's imports and exports are distributed evenly throughout the world. The equilibrium reflected in Europe's foreign trade with Greater East Asia, on the one hand, and with North America, on the other, is noteworthy. Africa's trade is confined almost entirely to Europe.




FIG. 1c

MAP IV.

North America's foreign trade constitutes 24 percent of the world's commerce. Its international commercial relations are not as well balanced as Europe's. North American trade centers primarily on Europe, especially in exports. North American trade with South America is considerably smaller than Europe's.




FIG. 1d

MAP V.

The foreign trade of Greater East Asia—China, Japan, India, Australia and several other countries—embraces 19 percent of the total world trade. The exchange of goods between this section and North America is especially well balanced. Approximately one-third of East Asia's trade flows to Europe.




FIG. 1e

public opinion to neutrality, was mailed to 80,000 subscribers in the United States by the Germany Library of Information in New York (Strausz-Hupe 1942, 121). On these maps, the world was divided into four economic spheres (*Grosswirtschaftsräume*), each with its own core, shaded black; food and raw-material zones, lightly shaded; and empty zones, blank. Trade between Euraf-rica and Panamerica is clearly dominant. In a related series of maps, the trading relationships of the cores, except the Soviet Union, were portrayed, and almost all of Africa's trade was with Europe. This division was interpreted as being the new world order after the war (Strausz-Hupe 1942, 121-123). Although they have been widely accepted as evidence of a geopolitical doctrine, there is no proof that Haushofer's group participated in the production of these maps. Indeed, there existed a recognizable difference between Nazi or governmental propaganda maps and those produced by the geopolitikers (Herb 1989). The cartographic attempts to promote American neutrality by portraying the United States as the dominant force in the Western Hemisphere and a global coequal of Germany and Japan were called "magic geography" (Speier 1941). The geopolitikers argued that the British and French colonial possessions were a threat to the Monroe Doctrine and that colonial exploitation by those powers should cease (War in maps 1941).

During the early years of World War II, the aim of the geopolitikers was to keep the United States and the Soviet Union neutral, while the Axis powers defeated France and the United Kingdom and instituted a new regime in their former colonial possessions, which included their incorporation into Euraf-rica. Germany relinquished its colonial claims in the south Pacific and allocated that area to Japan as part of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Zone. The Eurasian heartland was allocated to the Soviet Union, which resulted in a fourfold panregional division, until the German invasion of that country in 1941. Thereafter, the heartland was incorporated into the German panregion. In the panregional assignments, the configuration of the Soviet zone was inconsistent (Whittlesey 1944; Chaliand and Rageau 1985, 24). It is noteworthy that Whittlesey (1944, 401) constructed his map of four panregions on the basis of the writings, not the maps, of the geopolitikers. Despite lack of precision about regional boundaries, the geopolitikers recognized that any new world order would involve the end of French and British imperialist domination, the demise of which was the subject of many articles in "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik."

Haushofer recognized that the vertical division of the globe into panregions was at odds with the circumferential view advocated by Mackinder. Late in his career, Haushofer (1943) tried to reconcile these differences. He argued that world history had traditionally been characterized by a spread along the lines of latitude, but in the twentieth century a vertical organization and a deepening of ties were occurring. A map indicated forcefully the southward extension of the core areas of the four panregions, with the heartland portrayed as a separate unit. Haushofer contended that Mackin-

der's heartland theory was valid only so long as the Soviet Union was centripetally focused on its inner area and so long as the United States was similarly concerned with internal matters. With a Soviet thrust to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and with efforts by the United States to extend its dominance to South America, the south Atlantic, and the Pacific, a new interpretation, vertical extension of the cores, was needed. He was, in effect, making a calculated prediction of late-twentieth-century political and economic spatial strategies for the four leading powers—the European Community, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

We contend that the panideas and their translation into panregions were more central to the polemical and critical literature directed against German geopolitics in the Anglo-Saxon world than to Haushofer and his circle, on the evidence given to the topic in their publications. For the geopolitikers the primary goal was the creation of a culturally homogeneous spatial unit in Europe under German domination, supported by economic and military power. In this scheme, Africa was merely an appendage of Europe that was necessary for procuring raw materials. The Eurafrika idea and its region were not precisely defined, and the format changed over time. From the perspective of increased German influence, it was mainly a question of whether and how to combine expansion into eastern and southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Formal colonial relations were generally suspect, and the costs of empire were considered to exceed the economic benefits. For Haushofer, Eurafrika was part of a global division from the start.

World-systems analysis gives some indication of the changing role of states in the global economy and the effect of these changing environments on policymakers and their academic advisers (Sloan 1988). From a political-economic viewpoint, the division of the globe into more or less autarkic blocs, one of which would be Eurafrika, could be a corollary of the global economic downswing in the interwar period (Wallerstein 1984). Core capitalist countries in such circumstances tend to secure markets by political means, whereas they tend to subscribe to free-trade doctrines in upswings (Taylor 1989). Additionally, as the primary role in the economic core of the world system had recently shifted from Great Britain to the United States, with Germany remaining a challenger and Japan moving to the forefront, the idea of uniting Europe to create market homogeneity and of protecting it and the stocks of raw materials for the industrial sector from American intrusion seems rather obvious. Guarantees of similar advantages to other main powers in the core would assure global capitalist order without overt war. For the geopolitikers, the Bolshevik regime in its external economic relations was subject to the same logic as capitalism and behaved territorially in a manner similar to that of the unequivocal members of the capitalist core.

From a political-military viewpoint, the period 1914–1945 was a phase of global warfare, when Germany challenged British leadership and a coalition

led by the United States successfully countered the challenge (Modelski 1987). The promotion of Eurafrika by the geopolitikers was part of the German attempt to undo the European balance of power that was basic to the British position and to surpass, at least, the French role in Africa. The German view of a panregional globe in the 1930s is especially informative for future geopolitics (Parker 1985; Taylor 1989). In the remainder of this article we examine the question of whether the various portions of Eurafrika and the rest of the globe have taken on the roles envisioned by Haushofer and his circle.

EURAFRIKA SINCE THE 1930s

The Panidean of the geopolitical writers surveyed above and the specific panidea of Eurafrika are relatively obscure in the international-relations and political-economy literatures. Yet discussion of tripartite economic divisions of the globe appear increasingly as postwar American hegemony ebbs and as new centers bid for regional dominance (Cerny 1989). A putative yen bloc, encompassing the region anchored by Seoul, Singapore, Sydney, and San Francisco and centered on Tokyo, has received the most attention (Coker 1988; Maidment 1989). A rank order of regional bonding listed the Pacific basin as the frontrunner, followed by North America and Latin America and then by Euro-Africa (Higgott 1986, 290).

It is useful for both the development of political-geographical theory and a geographical examination of contemporary international relations to complement the preceding historical discussion with empirical evidence of European-African relations, their evolution, and their apparent directions. In this discussion Europe means western Europe as the logical manifestation of the integrated continent that the geopolitikers envisaged. The evidence for the existence of a Eurafrika will be presented from an African perspective to emphasize the links of that continent with either Europe or the rest of the world. Eurafrika could be viewed as a political-geographical reality if there existed a high absolute level of links between the two regions, a high proportion of all links on both sides directed at each other, or a large number of mutual links compared with the attraction of both units from all parts of the world system. We cannot deal with all ways of expressing links between Europe and Africa in this article, so we limit ourselves to an African perspective.

In this section we analyze three related issues: to what extent Eurafrika can be considered a cohesive political-geographical unit, how this cohesiveness has developed over time, and by what mechanism and policies such cohesiveness can be maintained. We examine different types of linkages, measured between countries that in turn are aggregated into three units: western Europe, Africa, and the rest of the world. European-African ties are highlighted relative to intra-African ones and to African connections with the rest of the world. Within these three macro units, the most important connecting nodes are identified. Explanations are suggested in terms of the

structural features of the environment, including global scale, territoriality of African states, and performance of individual political units.

To indicate the network of links between the state apparatuses of different countries, we investigate the exchange of diplomatic missions on a bilateral basis and the common memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that refer to shared multilateral political arenas. Additionally we describe the pattern of direct connecting flights between major airports, because it reveals governmental preferences. Diplomatic missions, IGOs, and direct-flight connections provide evidence to determine opportunities for future links and, in some ways, summarize the regularized patterns that have resulted from previous contacts. Finally we survey some ongoing contacts and interactive flows in two vital components—the economy (trade and direct foreign investment and aid) and security (military interventions, arms sales, and troop assistance). We conclude with an assessment of Eurafica as a political-geographical concept and of its current status.

DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

In 1965, immediately after most of Africa achieved political independence, almost all states there received diplomatic missions from the main Western countries—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. These missions were reciprocated only to a small extent. This nonsymmetry also applied at the time to linkages between African states and Israel. Other governments and Africans themselves were determining their priorities among African states. Some countries—Ghana, Sudan, The Netherlands, and Sweden—immediately established a wide network of at least twenty diplomatic posts in Africa, while others—Denmark, Finland, Libya, and Zaire—had fewer than ten at that stage.

More than twenty years later, a large and balanced network, reflecting the enduring interests and power-base elements in Africa, has evolved. Some of the increase in diplomatic ties stems from further decolonialization, but most is a consequence of new links between states that were independent before 1965. Western European countries have hardly changed the number of their missions, but more African states now reciprocate. In Belgium almost every African country has a diplomatic mission that concurrently looks after the country's interests with the European Community at its Brussels headquarters. African missions to the United States are almost universal. Additionally the rest of the world in 1985 was generally represented in Africa. The major powers, especially the Soviet Union and China and, to a lesser extent, Japan, had diplomatic exchanges with almost all African states. The increase of African missions to the rest of the world has been even more rapid. Links with Israel have been severed—a decrease from twenty-four missions to five—which reflects the pressure of Arab states and the development of a cohesive third-world bloc in the United Nations on the question of a Palestinian homeland.

In relative terms, the largest expansion in numbers of diplomatic missions has been among African states. Most still maintain only a few diplomatic links—sending and receiving fewer than ten missions—with other African states. The increase of missions occurred in all parts of the intra-African network. Algeria and Nigeria remained among the top five in sending and receiving during the past two decades. Egypt and Zaire recently acquired top-five rank, but Ghana and Sudan lost it. Libya now sends far more missions (twenty-five) than it receives (eight), a reflection of its government's desire to play a prominent role in the affairs of the continent. The Ivory Coast became a net gainer of missions (fifteen sent and twenty received), presumably for its recently acquired central role in transportation networks and its emergence as a favored location for multinational corporations.

Countries that are well connected within Africa are generally the ones that maintain numerous contacts with other states elsewhere. An exception is South Africa, which maintains relatively many missions outside the continent but is isolated within it. Liberia and Cameroon, on the other hand, are typical countries with strong links within Africa. Weakly connected states generally exchange missions with most of their neighbors and with some top-ranking countries elsewhere on the continent. The pace of change was faster during the first decade of the 1965–1986 period (Shaw and Heard 1979). Apparently the status hierarchy and the diplomatic network have stabilized.

With the gaining of independence by African states after 1965, the United States, the European colonial powers, and other western European countries initially dominated the pattern of bilateral diplomatic links. Later the African states became actively involved in a dispersed network. From the perspective of diplomatic linkages, the concept of Eurafrika is fading.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

As a matter of course after independence, African states became members of most IGOs that constitute the United Nations. UN memberships provided an important sign of legitimation for many weak states and an access to desperately needed expertise in functional activities such as agriculture, health care, and statistical apparatus. Apart from this, the general pattern of involvement in IGOs has become more and more intra-African. Although the number of IGOs worldwide and in Africa has increased rapidly during recent years, the range of membership is small, usually on a regional basis. Clusters determined by an analysis of shared IGO memberships in 1970 and 1980 do not show an all-African grouping. Instead, an Arab cluster and former French- and British-colonial ones appear, while the remainder are too weakly involved to be considered part of any grouping (Nierop 1989).

The membership patterns of African IGO clusters lack significant European participation. The Arab cluster has strong links with non-African states. This pan-Arab group has become considerably stronger and more coherent since the 1950s with shared IGO memberships, but it is still less formidable

in terms of firm commitments, like military ones, that some IGOs demand of members. The former French- and British-colonial clusters remain very weak and diffuse, with some overlap between the two in the 1980s because Ghana and Nigeria joined many of the IGOs defining the formerly French cluster.

The all-African level, epitomized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), seems to be losing in salience to small-scale regions and clusters of noncontiguous states in both the numbers of IGOs they encompass and their relevance. In the multilateral political arena, African states have been active at the global level. They have also started forms of small-scale cooperation among themselves that sometimes continue previous efforts of the colonial powers. Many of these efforts, like the East African Commission, have been spectacular failures. Unifying interest based on contiguity, as in the case of river basins, or on perceived shared interests, like a similar administration language, procedures inherited from a colonial administration, or a common culture, has encouraged subregional cooperation. The colonial legacy might have served as a basis for Eurafrika. Despite postcolonial agreements like the Lomé Convention to ensure that colonial links were not quickly abandoned, the intensity of contacts needed to define a formal global geopolitical bloc has not occurred for Eurafrika.

AIR LINKAGES

The international network of regular air flights started during the 1920s, and by 1930 Africa was very weakly linked internally and externally. There was some traffic between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. France had airline connections with French West Africa through Morocco. A route from Greece stretched to Dar es Salaam, with a branch from Sudan to India; this route integrated with the European network at Athens. Although the network increased nineteenfold, from 62 connections arriving and departing African international airfields in 1930 to 1,074 in 1984, its essential features have not changed much over the years. The North African Arab countries, especially Egypt, still have the largest number of intercontinental destinations, mostly to Europe, but links with the rest of the Middle East have increased considerably. Two main arteries of air traffic link Europe via Nairobi and Johannesburg to the eastern and southern part of Africa and via Lagos and Abidjan to western Africa. Within Africa, South Africa has become the main regional center, with Johannesburg the hub for almost all of the frontline states and for Zaire.

In contrast with the diplomatic network, air links are mostly reciprocated. Growth annually was especially rapid in the first period after independence, which was marked by a concentration on connections between Africa and the rest of the world. The general increase ended by 1973, and thereafter European-African links diminished slightly. By 1984 the absolute number

of links between Africa and the rest of the world had surpassed the total between western Europe and Africa. The density of intra-African connections now exceeds that of Eurafrika. The Africa-rest-of-the-world part of the network is far behind in proportion to dyads filled. Of all the countries connected to Africa by direct flights in 1984, France had by far the largest number of African destinations and the highest average flight frequencies. In western Europe, France was followed by the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany, with other countries well behind. The Soviet Union maintains linkages with less than one-half of the African countries, the United States with not more than one-fifth, China with Ethiopia only, and Japan with Egypt only. The busiest connection among the networks is the Cairo-Jidda route, with forty-six one-way flights a week.

For all countries with at least five African destinations, the year in which the maximum number of destinations was reached and the value of this maximum are indicators of intensity of linkages. Early maxima were frequently followed by decreases. Recent flight connections come mainly from eastern Europe and the Arab countries but also from the United Kingdom. Some countries, for example, the United States, India, and Yugoslavia, established new links in the immediate aftermath of independence but subsequently reduced them. The traditional nodes of African intercontinental traffic, France and Italy, joined the general stagnation and withdrawal after 1973.

There is little doubt that whatever reality Eurafrika had in terms of flight connections it has become much less pronounced. Eurafrika links are still strong, but they are weaker relatively and absolutely now than in the past. Bilateral diplomatic connections, multilateral shared IGO memberships, and direct-flight links reveal similar patterns. Relations with western Europe are still the most important external ties, but they have become less preponderant than they were in the decade after independence and in turn are weaker than in the colonial period. African states usually have bilateral diplomatic links with all major powers, but the direct air connections are more selective. The network of relations among African states is more intense, but it is by no means an all-African network: it is fragmented along lines of geographical contiguity and former colonial attachments. Some countries act as nodes in this internal African network, and these nodes are intimately tied to Europe and the rest of the world.

North African Arab countries form a cluster of nodes, and as a group they are most intimately linked to western Europe. They also have increasingly close linkages with other countries of the Middle East, and they have a high proportion of both diplomatic and air connections elsewhere in Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa there is a significant division between former British and French colonies that has been superseded to some extent by East-West alignment. South Africa is largely excluded from regular political contacts with other African states, but its important air links are proof of its crucial political-economic status in southern Africa.

ECONOMIC TIES

Trade between Europe and Africa was a small portion of global commerce on the eve of World War II. African trade was overwhelmingly oriented toward Europe, but Europe traded with all parts of the world, often intensively. By 1986 this pattern had not radically changed (IMF 1986): intra-African trade is still insignificant, at only 4 percent of Africa's external commerce, which in turn accounts for only 4 percent of international commerce. The main difference is the widened distribution of Africa's trade. The European share of African imports and exports was 80 to 90 percent in the 1930s, but it decreased to approximately 50 percent in the late 1980s. Europe in this instance is defined as the countries composing the European Community in 1985. The difference has only partially been redistributed among the other main trading countries of the world. The United States now receives 17 percent of African exports and provides 10 percent of its imports; Japan accounts for 5 percent of each. In terms of relative acceptance, Africa has a positive balance only with the European Community. Generally after independence a drop in relative acceptance occurred between former colonizer and colony (Dominguez 1971); an important exception to this rule was Equatorial Africa, which strengthened its orientation toward France in 1964.

The insignificant role of Africa in international trade is also reflected in its peripheral position in the transnationalization of private companies. The African share in the flows of direct foreign investment from OECD countries, still the chief source of such funds, and in the portion of affiliates of transnational corporations is below 5 percent, almost the same level as Africa's proportion of international trade (UN Center 1983). During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the worldwide flows of direct foreign investment grew at a rapid rate; yet although flows into Africa also increased, the African share decreased from 4.7 percent to 3.4 percent during the period 1970-72 to 1978-80. Relatively high stock values of direct foreign investments were found in a few African countries by the end of the 1970s. In Liberia, Nigeria, Zaire, and South Africa, the stock of these investments had a value of more than one billion dollars each. The vast majority of direct foreign investments in the late 1970s came mainly from the European Community, the United States, and Japan. The figures indicate a strong orientation of France and the United Kingdom toward Africa and modest attention to it from investors in other countries, including West Germany. The sheer size of total American overseas investments accounts for the important proportion of private American funds in Africa. As this global preponderance declines, the ratio of American investments in Africa may also decrease.

Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa, has become the principal recipient of developmental aid in the world. With 11.2 percent of the population of the developing countries, sub-Saharan Africa received 30 percent of all bilateral aid and 40 percent of all multilateral aid under the ODA definitions (OECD 1987, table XI-2). Since the early 1970s

total developmental aid has substantially increased, but the transfer to sub-Saharan Africa rose at an even more rapid pace. In constant dollar values, the annual amounts transferred in 1984–1985 were 2.7 times greater than in 1973. In northern Africa, only Egypt is a major recipient of this aid. Additionally African governments received important nonconcessional money flows during the 1970s, but, much reduced after the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, they are unlikely to return to their former levels in the near future.

Developmental aid is distributed in Africa through various channels, and it is increasingly devoted to food, immediate relief, and general support for governmental budgets. The principal donors have changed somewhat. Especially notable is the decreased share of aid from western Europe. The United States, OPEC countries, and multilateral channels became more important sources during the past decade. Some of these channels are European, but the change cannot be ascribed solely to a shift from bilateral to multilateral European aid.

At present Africa plays only a small role in the world economic system. Developed countries generally perceive Africa as an economic burden, a viewpoint increasingly shared by non-European economic powers such as Japan. Despite occasional outbursts of popular sympathy with the suffering of African peoples, which politically means increased developmental aid, interest in and orientation toward Africa are marginal. In strictly economic terms there is no integrated Eurafica as envisioned by the geopolitikers in Germany during the 1930s, nor is there evidence of any trend in that direction.

MILITARY CONNECTIONS

That leaves one other possible geopolitical linkage: ties based on international security and military intervention. During the 1970s absolute annual growth of major arms imports into Africa equaled that of the Middle East (Brzoska and Olson 1985). Because of a start at a low level, the rate of increase for Africa was by far the highest for any world region. After 1979 imports of major arms diminished precipitously in most of Africa, but not in Egypt, where imports soared after the relatively modest levels of the late 1970s (Luckham 1985, 302). Immediately after African independence the Soviet Union became the chief source of large weapons systems in Africa; this preponderant position has been undercut in recent years. The western European share has hovered between one-quarter and one-third of all imports during the past twenty-five years.

The main recipients of large weapons systems were the countries with the largest armies. Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco were listed among the twenty largest weapons importers in the third world between 1981 and 1987 (SIPRI 1988). Together with South Africa and Ethiopia, these are the strongest military powers on the continent (Luckham 1985, 304). Recent arms imports of all kinds are estimated to account for 12 percent of all foreign trade or one-third of all imports of machinery and transportation equipment.

Internal wars with outside intervention have been a frequent form of conflict in postindependence Africa. Arms supply remains the chief instrument of military intervention in these civil wars (Duner 1985). The training of armed forces and the supply of arms indicate moderate levels of intervention. Direct combat participation has occurred numerous times in the past three decades. The ratio of European intervention, mainly by France, has diminished, and the role of intervention by African countries has increased. Intervention by the eastern bloc has been rare, only in Angola and Ethiopia, but large in scope. Recent intervenors have been the governments of neighboring states, and, because they are not necessarily strong military powers, operations have become less successful. Vicinity compensates for a lack of extensive military strength, and the spatial extent of African cooperative and conflict relations rarely extends beyond adjacent states.

The former colonial powers lost their monopoly on the sale of military equipment and dominance as intervenors when independence was granted. As in economic relationships, it makes little sense to think of Eurafrica as a cohesive security unit, and the temporal trend is a weakening of well-established postcolonial security ties.

CLOSING REMARKS

Neither economic nor military relations are evolving toward a cohesive Eurafrica. Ties weakened after formal independence of most African states. European states dominate economically, but their position is increasingly challenged by the United States and the Arab countries. Militarily, western Europe and the eastern bloc have only marginal interests in Africa. A situation seems to be evolving in which western Europe remains the most important international point of reference for Africa, but with less intense ties than during the colonial past. Legitimacy of regimes is a dilemma for African states. Besides the apartheid government in South Africa, many other African regimes have been unable to communicate regularly with their citizens, a necessary precondition of legitimate government. Interaction with developmental agencies and international organizations bolsters weak governments by providing means of survival, but it also may seriously impair opportunities for autonomous growth and may interfere malevolently in relations between state and population.

After independence many African states preferred continuation of colonial economic ties rather than free trade. The involvement of small African economies in the world system remains much more limited than the literature in the Wallerstein tradition indicates. The weak African economies tend to withdraw from large-scale circuits, and under often chaotic circumstances, sizable proportions of the inhabitants become dependent on foreign aid or relapse into barter arrangements and self-sufficient livelihoods.

From a political-military perspective, the postwar decades saw the emergence of United States hegemony. American influence was not comprehensive, and the Soviet Union was active militarily in Africa. Even the Chinese

made a short but futile effort to achieve tangible influence in the early 1960s. Soviet or Soviet-assisted challenges became more numerous around 1970 when the American hegemonic cycle started to wane. No power has been able or willing to maintain international peace in Africa, probably owing less to the dynamics of the long cycle than to the intricate political problems of the continent and the low priority given to the situation by the major powers. Because of marginal involvement in world affairs, world-system analyses do not account adequately for the evolution of African political and economic patterns.

In spite of official decolonization, many African states are neoprotectorates, so-called indigenous governments controlled in many ways by outside political forces. The protection is less formal than under nineteenth-century imperialism and often is engineered by groups of states and by multilateral agencies. Outside protectors have not been especially eager for direct warfare; the intra-Africa hierarchy is too unstable and disputed to provide a modicum of regional dominance. So neoprotectorates are allowed to intervene in intra-African quarrels that reproduce the immature European state system of the sixteenth century with the vehemence of twentieth-century weaponry.

The geopolitikers correctly foresaw the eventual demise of French and British colonial power in Africa. However, the role ascribed to their Eurafrika concept has not been fulfilled. The less formal ties with Africa that they preferred as a colonial policy did not guarantee effective dominance. The existent political relationships are used only partially to secure indispensable raw materials, but mainly to keep the ramshackle grid of the African state system from collapse. Eurafrika was part of a global vision based on order through dominance and balance of power on a panregional scale.

Since 1985 all indicators show a lessening of superpower activity in the third world. Concurrently main portions of the world are becoming more and more interlocked in a common economic network, specifically in finance, high-level commercial services, and high technology. New forms of integration at the world scale that largely bypass the speculation of the geopolitikers seem to be emerging and raise the question of how future geopolitical order in global terms will be maintained.

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